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FOREWORD 
nsufficient investment in R&D is often adduced as the key reason why 
Europe has lagged over the years behind the US in terms of economic 
growth. The biggest financial crisis in living memory has now abruptly 
thrown the economies on both sides of the Atlantic into a deep recession, 
shifting the attention of policy-makers and market operators from longer-
term growth factors towards the issue of how to sustain demand in the 
short run. It would be a grave mistake, however, to neglect fundamental 
issues such as R&D because of the urgency of the crisis. 
This study provides an in-depth comparative analysis of the structure 
of R&D in Europe.  Its findings contradict the often held idea that the gap 
between Europe and the US is due mainly to a greater specialization of the 
US in high-tech industries. Differences in firm size also seem to play only a 
minor role. R&D is usually associated with industry, and particularly 
manufacturing given that its main purpose is to find new products or better 
ways to produce existing ones. This study shows that R&D could also be a 
key factor in services. As services account for over two-thirds of GDP and 
employment, it is appropriate to understand the importance of R&D for 
this sector as well.  
An abrupt fall in investment played an important role in precipitating 
the recession and it will now be important to understand whether this 
represents a structural shift because financial markets are no longer willing 
to finance R&D investment. It remains to be seen whether the bank-based 
system adopted in Europe (especially on the continent) will provide a more 
resilient source of funding for R&D than the market based systems of the 
US and other countries with Anglo-Saxon-type financial systems. 
It is thus a pleasure for us at CEPS to present this study undertaken 
by Kristian Uppenberg, Senior Economist at the European Investment 
Bank, to the wider public. The EIB represents the institution which allows 
I ii | FOREWORD 
member states to pool their financial resources to foster investment and 
thus growth. Its mission has become even more important in these difficult 
times, and understanding the contribution of R&D to economic growth 
remains crucial. 
Daniel Gros 
Director, CEPS 
Brussels 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he 2010 initial deadline for achieving the Lisbon goals is fast 
approaching. It has been known for some time, however, that this 
ambitious agenda will not be achieved on time. Thus, this target year 
has long been abandoned from official policy documents. But while the 
Lisbon agenda’s initial timetable may have turned out to be unreasonable, 
its underlying economic logic is not.  
This study focuses on one of the targets set out at Lisbon: raising the 
level of research and development (R&D) in the business sector. The Lisbon 
agenda set the goal of raising the EU’s R&D spending to 3% of GDP, of 
which two-thirds should be by businesses rather than by the government 
or education sectors. This goal reflects widespread concern emerging in the 
late 1990s that Europe’s lingering gap in productivity growth vis-à-vis the 
US stemmed in no small part from a shortage of innovation in the business 
sector. This appeared to be a structural phenomenon, as the EU’s R&D gap 
with respect to the US and Japan had been in place and relatively constant 
over several decades. 
If this gap is to be narrowed, a better understanding of its causes is 
required. With the aim of aiding this understanding, this study 
decomposes aggregate business expenditures on R&D along several 
dimensions. Following the introduction, chapters 2 and 3 look at the 
sectoral distribution of business R&D spending across EU countries. 
Chapters 4 and 5 decompose R&D spending by firm size and by region, 
respectively. 
The sectoral decomposition shows that the business R&D gap 
between the EU and the US is not the result of different sectoral allocations. 
On the contrary, Europe is actually more specialised in relatively R&D-
intensive manufacturing sectors. Therefo r e ,  i f  o v e r  t i m e  E u r o p e  w e r e  t o  
emulate a US-style sectoral composition and expand services at the expense 
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of manufacturing, the R&D gap would actually widen, other things being 
equal. Europe’s lower overall level of R&D intensity is thus the result of 
lower levels of R&D intensity in individual sectors. This is especially the 
case in the manufacturing of information and communications technology 
and other non-transportation equipment as well as in the services sector. 
Although the R&D intensity in services is low when compared with 
manufacturing, its large size in the economy nevertheless translates into a 
large absolute number. Indeed, the services sector alone accounts for three-
quarters of the overall EU–US R&D gap. 
The second decomposition of R&D spending is by firm size. Survey 
data produced by Eurostat offer a wealth of information on R&D and 
innovation across countries and firm size classes. R&D by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, with up to 250 employees) accounts for a 
substantial proportion of total business R&D spending in some countries, 
although less so in large or highly innovative ones. Notably, in the US, 
Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Sweden, Finland and a few others, 
SMEs account for 20% or less of total business sector R&D. Pertinently, 
since the SMEs’ share of total R&D is smaller in countries with high overall 
R&D spending, including the US and Japan, it seems implausible that 
Europe’s lower overall level of R&D can be addressed through increased 
R&D by SMEs.  
Furthermore, reflecting their typically large share in total business 
R&D, large firms also receive the bulk of government support for R&D. 
Still, in most countries, SMEs are treated relatively favourably, receiving a 
greater share of public R&D support than their shares in total business 
R&D spending. One can therefore not argue that SMEs are being short-
changed by public R&D policies. 
Chapter 5 takes a regional look at R&D in Europe. Business R&D is 
concentrated in certain economic clusters as a direct consequence of the 
geographical concentration of economic activity in general. Yet the 
agglomeration of R&D goes even beyond this explanation, since R&D 
intensity (i.e. the ratio of R&D spending to regional value added) also tends 
to be higher in certain economic centres. The extent to which R&D is 
clustered in certain regions differs across countries. Typically, regional 
concentration is higher in countries with high aggregate levels of R&D 
spending. This is for instance the case in Germany and Sweden. Also, in the 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, R&D is usually more 
concentrated, reflecting the tendency of a large share of R&D activity to be 
located around the capital city and possibly one more economic centre. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | v 
 
 
That a high degree of regional clustering of R&D is otherwise more 
predominant in countries with high levels of R&D suggests that a 
successful elevation of other countries’ R&D intensities would also be 
accompanied by an increased regional density of R&D. 
Regional concentration of R&D is not a problem per se. There is 
strong evidence of non-negligible localised spillovers in R&D. This means 
that the R&D spending of one firm is more productive in terms of patent 
applications if it is located close to the R&D activities of other firms. 
Indeed, empirical studies show that the positive spillover effects of this 
kind of regional concentration are quite substantial. It follows from this that 
if R&D activities were evenly spread across Europe, for instance as a result 
of regionally targeted public support, such localised spillovers would be 
squandered. This would then lower the overall productivity of R&D and 
probably also of the economy as a whole. 
The different disaggregations of R&D data presented in this study 
help us to better understand the characteristics of the EU–US R&D gap. 
While the EU lags behind the US in aggregate R&D (and especially 
business R&D) spending, that is not true for all EU countries, regions or 
sectors. Although this study does not discuss specific policies to help boost 
business R&D spending in the EU or its effectiveness, any such policies will 
have to take into account this diversity. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
he empirical literature on economic growth of the past several 
decades has broadly converged on the view that long-term economic 
success depends crucially on what is known as total factor 
productivity (TFP). TFP is that part of economic growth that does not stem 
from increasing the amount of fixed capital or labour, but from their more 
effective use in terms of output. One key ingredient in achieving such 
productivity gains is product and process innovation. Innovation is the 
output of a complex process that includes organisational designs, 
incentives and competition, none of which is easily measured. A more 
readily measurable input into the innovative process is the resources 
allocated directly to the invention of new products and processes in the 
form of research and development (R&D). Although only one of several 
inputs into the innovative process, R&D expenditures have been found to 
have a strong causal influence on innovation outputs such as patents and 
productivity gains. 
The 2000 Lisbon strategy grew out of the recognition that Europe was 
persistently lagging behind the US, Japan and other leading industrial 
nations in terms of innovation and productivity growth. Its goal was to 
close this growth gap by directly targeting several of those key inputs that 
have been found to affect economic growth, including employment rates, 
higher education and R&D.  
The focus of this study is to shed some light on Europe’s relatively 
low level of R&D spending when compared with the US and Japan. One 
key characteristic of this gap is its persistence and constancy over the past 
several decades, as suggested by Figure 1. US R&D spending averaged 
2.6% of GDP in the period 1981–90, exactly the same as the 1991–2004 
average. In Japan the ratio rose, from 2.7 to 3.0%, while in the EU it rose 
from 1.6 to 1.9% of GDP. These figures strongly suggest that the R&D gap  
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between the EU-15 and its main competitors is a long-term phenomenon 
that has structural rather than cyclical causes, and that these structural 
causes are still in place. The stability of these variables imply that including 
one or two more years of data (which is currently not possible owing to the 
long lags in the publication of these statistics) would not substantially 
change the picture. 
Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (as a percentage of GDP) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
A second key characteristic of the EU–US R&D gap is that it is 
entirely attributable to the business sector, as shown in Figure 2. In the 
government and higher education sectors, there is little difference in R&D 
spending across the major economies. As recognised in the Lisbon strategy, 
if Europe is to boost its overall level of R&D spending towards those levels 
seen in the US and Japan, it will mostly have to occur in the business sector. 
For this reason, the rest of this report concentrates on the business sector. INTRODUCTION | 3 
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of R&D spending (as a percentage of GDP, 2000–04) 
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Sources: Eurostat and own calculations. 
While the basic facts of R&D spending discussed above are relatively 
well known, there is a wealth of information hidden within these 
aggregates that is less frequently discussed. The purpose of this study is to 
illuminate the causes of Europe’s relatively low R&D spending through a 
more in-depth exploration of the R&D statistics. For this purpose, the 
following four chapters of this book decompose business R&D spending 
along several dimensions. Chapters 2 and 3 look at the distribution of 
business R&D spending across sectors and across EU countries. A key 
question posed here is to what extent cross-country differences in business 
R&D spending can be accounted for by their sectoral specialisation. 
Chapter 4 decomposes R&D by firm size, focusing in particular on the role 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in R&D spending. Chapter 5 
looks at the regional distribution of business R&D spending in the EU. In 
this context, we also address the influence of the positive externalities of 
R&D on its geographical concentration. 4 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
For the most part, data limitations mean that the EU is represented in 
this study by the EU-15 or some sub-sample of the ‘old’ EU member states. 
In this context, terms such as ‘EU-10’ always refer to sub-samples of old EU 
member states. As suggested by Figure 2, R&D spending in the new 
member states (NMS) of the EU remains substantially below the EU 
average. Because of both data limitations and the particular circumstances 
of these countries, R&D in the NMS is not covered in any great detail in this 
study. 
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2.  R&D: A SECTORAL DECOMPOSITION 
ot all sectors of any economy are equally intensive in the use of 
R&D. Some sectors, such as the manufacturing of information and 
communications technology (ICT) or transport equipment, depend 
on extensive product and process innovation to thrive in their highly 
contested global marketplace. Other sectors, notably services, devote a 
much smaller share of their resources to R&D. A natural starting point 
when trying to understand the aggregate R&D gap between the EU and the 
US is therefore to disaggregate R&D expenditures by sector. This will help 
us address two important questions: 
i)  Does the R&D gap stem from different sectoral specialisations or from 
lower R&D intensities in individual sectors?  
ii)  Does the R&D gap exist in just a few sectors or is it an economy-wide 
phenomenon? 
The answers to these questions have great bearing on how to design 
policies aimed at raising aggregate R&D intensity in the EU. In addressing 
them, we draw on sectoral R&D and value added data published by the 
OECD for the business sector.1  
2.1  Is sectoral composition at the root of the EU’s low overall 
R&D intensity compared with the US? 
To obtain a sectoral measure for R&D intensity that is comparable to the 
country aggregates above, we divide the non-agricultural business sector 
                                                      
1 The data used in this chapter are from the OECD’s Analytical Business Enterprise 
Research and Development database (ANBERD), also available in paper format as 
OECD (2006). 
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R&D (BERD) by the total value added in each sector, i.e. the sectoral 
equivalent of GDP. The major sectors2 we look at are the following: 
•  Manufacturing of transport equipment 
•  Manufacturing of ICT and other non-transport machinery and 
equipment 
•  Manufacturing of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and non-metal minerals 
•  Manufacturing of food, textiles, leather, wood and paper products 
•  Manufacturing of basic metals and metal products 
•  Other manufacturing 
•  Electricity, gas and water supply 
•  Construction 
•  Commercial services 
The EU is represented here by 10 EU countries (henceforth the EU-10) 
for which industry-level data are available. These are Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK.3 The data have been averaged over the 2000–03 period to eliminate any 
short-term cyclical effects. 
To begin with, Figure 3 shows the sectoral composition of the three 
economies studied, by value added. Commercial services are by far the 
single largest industry, accounting for well over half the value added of the 
non-agricultural business sector. If it were the case that the EU specialised 
in less R&D-intensive sectors, then this would also imply that its lower 
aggregate R&D intensity was at least partly a sectoral problem, as opposed 
to a problem of insufficient R&D spending in individual sectors. But that is 
not the case, at least not at this level of sectoral disaggregation. The three 
sectors with the highest levels of R&D intensity are shown at the bottom of 
the figure, more specifically: 
1)  the manufacturing of transportation equipment,  
2)  the manufacturing of ICT and other non-transport equipment, and  
3)  the manufacturing of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and non-metal 
minerals.  
 
                                                      
2 Some smaller sectors have been bundled together. 
3 These 10 countries account for 96% of the GDP of the EU-15. R&D: A SECTORAL DECOMPOSITION | 7  
 
Figure 3. Sectoral composition of value added (as a percentage of country/region 
total, average 2000–03) 
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Source: OECD. 
We can see in Figure 3 that these three relatively R&D-intensive 
sectors account for a larger share of the total business sector value added in 
the EU than in the US (although their share is even higher in Japan). As 
Figure 4 shows, R&D spending as a share of value added averages between 
10 and 20% in these three sectors, compared with less than 5% of value 
added in all other business sectors. These three groups account for 60-80% 
of total business R&D spending in the EU, the US and Japan, while 
constituting only 10-15% of total business value added.  
Figure 4. R&D intensity in selected industries (R&D spending as a percentage of 
value added, average 2000–03) 
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To illustrate the relative importance of sectoral specialisation vs. 
sectoral R&D intensity in accounting for the overall R&D gap between the 
EU and the US, we conduct two simple counterfactual simulations, shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Business sector R&D intensity (as a percentage of value added) 
US business sector R&D intensity, actual  2.7 
EU-10 business sector R&D intensity, actual  1.9 
1) EU R&D intensity with US sectoral composition  1.5 
2) EU sectoral composition with US R&D intensity  3.0 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
First, let us assume that the EU had the same sectoral composition as 
the US, but kept its actual R&D intensity sector-by-sector (1). Since this 
sectoral reallocation would actually reduce the shares of the three most 
R&D-intensive sectors in the EU economy, the result would be to lower the 
EU’s overall R&D intensity, from 1.9 to 1.5% of value added. 
Second, let us assume instead that the EU’s R&D intensity was 
identical to that of the US, sector-by-sector, while maintaining its own 
sectoral composition (2). This would raise the R&D intensity of the EU to 
3.0% of value added, above that of the US. 
On balance, this simple exercise shows that at this level of sectoral 
disaggregation, the EU’s relatively low overall R&D intensity is not caused 
by a sectoral specialisation skewed towards less R&D-intensive sectors, but 
by low R&D intensity within sectors. 
2.2  The R&D gap between the EU and the US is concentrated on 
just a few sectors 
The EU may be suffering from an overall R&D deficit relative to the US and 
Japan, but that is not the case in all sectors. On the contrary, as illustrated 
by Table 2, virtually the entire R&D gap between the EU and the US stems 
from just two broad sectors:  
•  First is the manufacturing of ICT and other non-transportation 
machinery and equipment. In this sector, US R&D intensity is twice as 
high as that of the EU. 
•  Second is the commercial services sector. Here US R&D intensity is 
three times that of the EU. R&D: A SECTORAL DECOMPOSITION | 9  
 
Table 2. Sources of the EU–US gap in business sector R&D intensity 
  % of sector value added   
  EU-10  US 
US–EU 
gap 
US–EU gap 
as a % of 
EU level 
Transport equipment  16.3  16.0  -0.3  -2 
ICT and other non-transport 
  equipment  10.5  21.0  10.6  101 
Chemicals and  
  pharmaceuticals  10.0  9.0  -1.0  -10 
Metals and minerals  1.3  1.4  0.1  9 
Food, textiles, wood and paper  0.8  1.2  0.4  57 
Utilities 0.6  0.1  -0.5  -88 
Commercial services  0.4  1.3  0.9  215 
Construction 0.1  0.1  0.0  -45 
All industries  1.9  2.6  0.7  37 
Source: OECD. 
The large lead that the US has in these three sectors contrasts sharply 
with some other sectors, where Europe is on par with or even above the US 
levels of R&D intensity. These include, notably, the manufacturing of 
transport equipment and the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector. 
So let us take a closer look at the two major sectors in which the US 
has a clear lead in terms of R&D intensity, beginning with the 
manufacturing of ICT and other non-transport machinery and equipment. 
To illustrate the importance of this sector, if we assume counterfactually 
that the EU were to raise the R&D intensity in the ICT and other non-
transport equipment sector to that of its US equivalent, while leaving R&D 
spending in all other sectors unchanged, this alone would bridge over four-
fifths of the EU’s business sector R&D gap vis-à-vis the US. 
Services are the second sector in which there is a large gap in R&D 
intensity between the EU and the US. In the EU-10, R&D spending amounts 
to 0.4% of the sector’s value added, against 1.3% in the US. In addition, the 
US commercial services sector is larger, accounting for 72% of business 
sector value added, against 65% in the EU. Similar to the previous case, 
bridging the EU–US R&D gap in commercial services alone (i.e. leaving 
R&D intensity in all other sectors unchanged) would eliminate some four-
fifths of the EU–US R&D gap for the business sector as a whole. Even 
though R&D intensity in services is low relative to that in manufacturing, 10 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
the very large size of this sector nevertheless makes it a significant element 
in the total.  
To better understand where the EU–US R&D gap in commercial 
services lies, it helps to decompose commercial services into its main 
industries:  
•  wholesale and retail trade and repairs;  
•  transport, storage and communication; 
•  financial intermediation; and 
•  renting, real estate, IT services and R&D.4 
As shown in Figure 5, it turns out that there are distinct differences 
across these sub-sectors when it comes to the R&D gap. In effect, a 
significant gap exists in only two of the four sectors listed above: in 
wholesale and retail trade and repairs, and in renting, real estate, IT services and 
R&D. Together these two sectors account for more than two-thirds of the 
commercial services sector’s value added and R&D spending in both the 
EU and the US. 
Figure 5. R&D intensity within commercial services (R&D spending as a 
percentage of value added, average 2000–03) 
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Source: OECD. 
                                                      
4 In the OECD ANBERD tables, this category is referred to as “Real estate, renting 
and business activities”. This category contains a heterogeneous set of activities, 
including IT services, software and R&D. R&D: A SECTORAL DECOMPOSITION | 11  
 
The EU–US gap in R&D intensity in retail and wholesale trade  and 
repairs is particularly noteworthy. This sector accounts for around one-
quarter of the value added of the services sector and the transatlantic 
divide in terms of R&D spending is enormous. In the US, firms in this 
sector spend 1.9% of value added on R&D, against 0.1% in the EU.5  
The second R&D gap in services is in the sector that we call renting, 
real estate, IT services and R&D. US R&D intensity in this sector is double 
that of the EU. This is by far the largest services-sector segment, accounting 
for just under half the value added of the commercial services sector in 
both the US and the EU. 
2.3  Sectors with a large transatlantic gap in R&D also tend to 
have a large gap in productivity growth 
The sectoral distribution of the EU–US R&D gap becomes especially 
interesting when compared with productivity developments. Without 
inferring a direct causality from R&D to productivity, it is nevertheless 
striking that the sectoral productivity gap between the EU and the US 
largely mirrors the R&D gap described above. A string of recent studies 
have analysed the widening EU–US productivity gap using a sectoral 
approach. Several papers by Bart Van Ark and his co-authors observe, for 
example, that virtually the entire gap in productivity growth between the 
EU and the US is attributable to only a few sectors, particularly ICT 
production and market services (Figure 6).6  
The productivity gap in market services is furthermore driven almost 
exclusively by distribution services (i.e. wholesale and retail trade) and 
finance and business services. In other words, the EU–US productivity gap 
stems from exactly those sectors in which the R&D gap is also the greatest 
(Figure 7).  
                                                      
5 R&D data for France are not available for this sector, so the EU average is based 
on the other nine countries in the sample. 
6 See B. Van Ark, J. Melka, N. Mulder & M. Timmer (2002), B. Van Ark, R. Inklaar 
& R.H. McGuckin (2002 and 2003) and B. Van Ark, M. O’Mahoney & M.P. Timmer 
(2008). 12 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 6. Productivity growth gap between the US and the EU at a sectoral level 
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Source: Van Ark et al. (2008). 
Figure 7. Sectoral contribution to aggregate labour productivity growth (percent) 
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Source: Van Ark et al. (2008). 
Another recent study, by Daveri (2004), complements these results by 
focusing on the distinction between IT-producing and IT-using sectors. It 
finds that as much as two-thirds of the EU–US productivity growth gap can 
be accounted for by IT-using sectors (Figure 8). R&D: A SECTORAL DECOMPOSITION | 13  
 
Figure 8. Labour productivity growth in the US and the EU-15 (percent) 
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Source: Daveri (2004). 
Heavy spending on R&D in conjunction with a high level of 
investment in ICT therefore appears to have helped boost innovation and 
productivity gains in the US. In Europe, by contrast, these industries are 
characterised by a lower R&D intensity and less investment in ICT. This 
literature has stressed that the higher levels of R&D spending and 
productivity growth in these sectors in the US may in turn derive from a 
more competitive environment. This has paved the way for new 
approaches to organising these industries on a large scale that draws 
heavily on ICT investment. 
2.4  Concluding remarks 
This chapter has made a few key observations based on sectoral data from 
the OECD. First, the EU–US R&D gap cannot be explained simply as a by-
product of different sectoral specialisations, as it reflects a genuinely lower 
R&D intensity at a sectoral level as well. Second, a relatively small number 
of sectors account for this R&D gap, while in many others the EU is on par 
with the US. Third, there is a striking sectoral overlap between the R&D 
deficit and the productivity deficit when comparing the EU with the US, 
suggesting that R&D is indeed a crucial ingredient in the US productivity 
lead. 14 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
That the services sector is both larger and more R&D-intensive in the 
US than in the EU suggests that services cannot be ignored when trying to 
close the R&D gap. On the contrary, the EU is likely to see its services 
sector grow over time, thus following the US example. One reason is that 
higher incomes tend to shift aggregate demand towards services. Another 
is that the EU faces more competition from world trade in manufacturing 
than in services. In this context, Europe’s relatively favourable R&D 
position in manufacturing offers little consolation. If Europe cannot close 
its R&D gap with the US in services, the overall R&D gap is likely to widen 
rather than narrow as the share of services in total value added grows. But 
in order for business R&D to pick up in the services sector, lingering 
structural impediments to innovation in this sector must be addressed. The 
US example strongly suggests that higher R&D spending, innovation and 
productivity gains in the services sector are all inexorably linked to 
competition. Short of implementing these broader structural changes, it is 
difficult to see how Europe can expect substantial convergence in total 
business R&D spending towards the level seen in the US. 
One caveat may be necessary, however. One needs to be aware that 
the results of this kind of sectoral study are not independent of the chosen 
level of sectoral disaggregation. The more aggregated the sectors used, the 
greater is the risk that each sector consists of sub-sectors that are not 
homogeneous. As a consequence, what may appear to be a gap in sectoral 
R&D intensity at an aggregated level can sometimes be explained by a 
different sectoral specialisation at higher levels of disaggregation, rather 
than different R&D intensities in the disaggregated sectors. This is for 
instance the case in the sector that we refer to as ‘ICT and other non-
transport equipment’. This sector contains both very R&D-intensive IT 
manufacturing and less R&D-intensive manufacturing of other types of 
equipment. The US is more specialised towards IT manufacturing within 
this sector than the EU. When IT is bundled together with other types of 
equipment manufacturing, it appears as if R&D intensity is much higher in 
the US than in the EU, even though the two economies have a similar R&D 
intensity in the narrowly defined IT sector.7 What seems like a higher 
sectoral R&D intensity in the US may in reality be a greater specialisation in 
high-tech/highly intensive R&D segments within each sector. Still, 
although there is a need to be aware of these issues, they are unlikely to 
materially alter our main conclusion, which is that the EU–US R&D gap 
stems from just a few sectors and not from the economy as a whole. 
                                                      
7 For further discussion, see Sheehan & Wyckoff (2003).  
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3.  R&D VARIES ACROSS EU COUNTRIES, 
BUT IN THE SERVICES SECTOR THEY  
ALL LAG BEHIND THE US 
he previous chapter concluded that the EU’s R&D intensity lags 
behind that of the US because of just a few sectors, notably services. 
This chapter uses the same OECD data set to explore differences in 
sectoral R&D spending across EU countries. One question that is posed 
here is whether countries in the EU with high levels of R&D could serve as 
role models for the rest of the EU. 
R&D spending varies markedly across EU countries and – as shown 
in Table 3 and Figure 9 – there has been little tendency for these differences 
to diminish over time. 
In terms of overall R&D intensity (which includes government, 
education and business sectors), EU countries can be divided into three 
broad groups: 
•  The first group consists of countries that have maintained below-
average R&D spending. This group includes Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy and Ireland. Also, what little improvement there has been in 
overall R&D spending is not accounted for by the business sector. 
•  A second group consists of EU countries (including many of the large 
ones) that have maintained R&D spending levels close to or 
marginally above the EU average, but have failed to close the gap vis-
à-vis Japan and the US. This group includes Germany, France, the 
UK, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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•  A third group consists of several smaller EU countries – Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark and Austria – that have made clear progress in 
raising their R&D spending levels since the 1980s. Sweden and 
Finland have even attained R&D intensities above that of the US. 
Table 3. R&D spending by sector (percent of GDP) 
   Total R&D  Business R&D 
Government and 
education R&D 
   1990–99  2000–05  1990–99  2000–05  1990–99  2000–05 
Japan 2.9  3.2  2.0  2.3  0.9  0.8 
US 2.6  2.7  1.8  1.9  0.7  0.8 
EU-15 1.8  1.9  1.1  1.2  0.7  0.7 
Sweden 3.2  4.0  2.3  3.0  0.9  1.0 
Finland 2.4  3.4  1.5  2.4  0.9  1.0 
Germany 2.3  2.5  1.6  1.7  0.7  0.8 
Denmark 1.8  2.4  1.1  1.7  0.7  0.8 
France 2.3  2.2  1.4  1.4  0.9  0.8 
Austria 1.6  2.1  na  1.4  na  0.7 
Belgium 1.7  1.9  1.2  1.4  0.5  0.6 
Netherlands 2.0  1.8  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.8 
UK 1.9  1.8  1.3  1.1  0.7  0.6 
Ireland 1.1  1.2  0.8  0.8  0.4  0.4 
Italy 1.1  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6 
Spain 0.8  1.0  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5 
Portugal 0.6  0.8  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.5 
Greece 0.5  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4 
Source: OECD. 
The success of the third group in boosting R&D spending raises the 
question of whether it might serve as a role model for other EU countries. 
To answer this question, it helps to distinguish between cross-country 
differences in sectoral R&D intensity and differences in sectoral 
composition (similar to the exercise that we conducted earlier for the EU  
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and the US). Again, to compare R&D intensities at the sectoral level, these 
have been calculated as the ratio of sectoral R&D spending to each sector’s 
value added, i.e. the sectoral equivalent of GDP. 
Figure 9. R&D intensities in selected EU countries (percent of GDP) 
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Source: Eurostat; 1994 data missing for Denmark. 
3.1  Most EU countries have lower R&D intensities than the US 
does, but not because of a specialisation towards less R&D-
intensive sectors 
As we discussed for the EU as a whole in the previous chapter, a low 
aggregate level of R&D intensity can be the result of either a sectoral 
orientation away from R&D-intensive sectors or a low R&D intensity in 
individual sectors. As shown in Figure 10, the second explanation is closer 
to the mark in the EU. In virtually all EU countries, the three most R&D-
intensive manufacturing sectors account for a share of total value added 
that is equal to or larger than that in the US. This is true even for those EU 
countries that have particularly low levels of national R&D intensities, such 
as Italy and Spain. This makes it unlikely that EU countries could boost 
aggregate R&D intensity simply through a shift towards more R&D-
intensive sectors. We illustrate that point more clearly in Box 1.  18 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 10. Percentage share of the top three ‘R&D-intensive’ sectors in the total 
non-farm business value added, average 2000–03 
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Source: OECD. 
Since sectoral composition cannot account for low aggregate R&D 
intensities in EU countries, the answer lies in low R&D intensities in 
individual sectors. In countries with low aggregate R&D intensities, such as 
Italy and Spain, below-average R&D intensity is found in virtually all 
sectors of the economy, including the top three most R&D-intensive ones 
mentioned earlier. 
Box 1. What if all EU countries were like Finland? 
Let us assume – counterfactually – that Spain and Italy had the same sectoral 
specialisation as Finland, while maintaining their actual R&D intensities sector- 
by-sector. As shown in Figure B1.1, this would only raise the overall R&D 
intensity in Italy and Spain from around 0.7% of value added to 0.9%. The order 
of magnitude of the impact is similar in most EU countries. For the EU-10 as a 
whole, a sectoral specialisation like that of Finland’s would raise its R&D 
intensity from 1.9 to 2.3% of value added. R&D BY SECTOR: VARIATION ACROSS EU COUNTRIES | 19 
 
Box 1. cont’d 
Figure B1.1 Actual and simulated business sector R&D intensity in a selection 
of European countries (percentage of value added)  
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But a sectoral reallocation is not the answer, nor is it likely that the rest of 
the EU could replicate Finland’s R&D intensity in manufacturing. Finland (along 
with Sweden) has achieved its very high levels of R&D intensity primarily in 
manufacturing (with 85% of total R&D spending compared with 63% in the US) 
and especially in ICT manufacturing. This makes the Nordic countries 
questionable role models for the rest of the EU. As the pie charts in Figures B1.2 
and B1.3 illustrate, a large share of US R&D spending is concentrated in the 
s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r .  A s  E u r o p e  i s  o v e r  t i m e  l i k e l y  t o  e m u l a t e  t h i s  s e c t o r a l  s h i f t  
towards services, it does not seem reasonable to expect to close the gap with the 
US predominantly through higher levels of R&D in manufacturing. 
Figure B1.2 Sectoral distribution of R&D expenditures in Finland  
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Box 1. cont’d 
Figure B1.3 Sectoral distribution of R&D expenditures in the US 
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3.2  High levels of R&D intensity in certain sectors for the EU as a 
whole does not mean high levels in all countries 
One consequence of economic integration is increased cross-border 
ownership and a concentration of R&D activities in key agglomerations. 
Positive, localised spillover effects imply that there are significant benefits 
from a geographical concentration of R&D.  
The manufacturing of transport equipment is a good example of this. 
As shown in Figure 11, there is substantial variation in the R&D intensity in 
this sector across EU countries. Those countries that have the highest R&D 
intensities in this sector – Sweden, Germany and France – are also typically 
major producers in this sector. Other EU countries have evolved – partly as 
a result of mergers and acquisitions – into primarily production sites with 
relatively little research and development in this sector. Examples of this 
are Finland, Spain and Belgium, all of which have large foreign-owned 
manufacturing plants of transport equipment such as automobiles. R&D BY SECTOR: VARIATION ACROSS EU COUNTRIES | 21 
 
Figure 11. R&D intensity in the manufacturing of transport equipment 
(percentage of sector value added)  
0 5 10 15 20 25
Ireland
Denmark
Finland
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
Japan
US
UK
EU-10
France
Germany
Sweden
 
Source: OECD. 
To illustrate more clearly the detachment of production and R&D in 
this sector, Figure 12 plots the size of the transport equipment sector on the 
horizontal axis against the sector’s R&D intensity on the vertical axis. To 
take an example, Sweden is in the top right corner of the diagram, with a 
high share of transport equipment in total business value added (4%) and a 
high level of R&D intensity in this sector (24% of transport sector value 
added). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Denmark engages in very 
little manufacturing of transport equipment and very little R&D in this 
sector, thus finding itself in the lower left corner of the diagram. Most 
countries fit into a broadly positive, linear relationship represented by the 
line in the diagram. This positive relationship essentially says that countries 
where the manufacturing of transport equipment accounts for a larger 
share of the economy are also more likely to have technologically leading 
companies with high levels of R&D intensity. The exceptions to this pattern 
are found below the line. Both Spain and Belgium have a substantial stake 
in the production of transport equipment, close to the EU average of 
between 2 and 3% of business value added. But their levels of R&D 
intensity in this sector are only one-third of the EU average. This reflects 
the fact that they are primarily production sites in this sector. 22 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 12. Transport equipment manufacturing: Value added share and R&D 
intensity, average 2000–03 (percentage)  
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
  The concentration of transport equipment R&D to just a few 
agglomerations is not in itself a problem. On the contrary, there is little 
economic justification for spreading R&D across all EU countries. If R&D in 
the transport equipment sector were to be evenly spread out across all EU 
countries, some of the localised knowledge spillovers in R&D would go to 
waste and the overall R&D conducted in Europe in this sector would likely 
be lower. It is noteworthy in this context that even though R&D intensity in 
some countries is low, the EU as a whole is on par with the US in this 
sector. 
3.3  In ICT and other non-transport equipment, a few EU leaders 
cannot make up for the many laggards 
In the manufacturing of transport equipment, the level of R&D is 
sufficiently high in the leading countries to compensate for low levels of 
R&D intensity in others. Hence, the aggregate R&D intensity for the EU as 
a whole compares favourably with that of the US. The same is true for the 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry, where the EU also compares 
favourably with the US. One major manufacturing sector where this is not 
the case is the manufacturing of ICT and other non-transport equipment. R&D BY SECTOR: VARIATION ACROSS EU COUNTRIES | 23 
 
As shown in Figure 13, high levels of R&D intensity in this sector are 
limited to a few countries. These cannot compensate for the fact that several 
major EU economies – including large countries such as Italy, Spain, 
Germany and the UK – lag far behind the US in this area. In short, in this 
sector the R&D leaders in the EU are too few and too small to compensate 
for the laggards. As a result, this sector is a major contributor to the overall 
business R&D gap vis-à-vis the US. 
Figure 13. R&D intensity in the manufacturing of ICT and other non-transport 
equipment (percentage of sector value added)  
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
3.4  In the services sector, the EU’s R&D intensity lags far behind 
that of the US almost without exception 
In commercial services, the picture is different from manufacturing in the 
sense that Europe’s low level of R&D intensity relative to the US 
characterises virtually all countries, with the notable exception of Denmark 
(Figure 14).8 
                                                      
8 The OECD has observed that there are still shortcomings in measuring R&D in 
services. As a result, some of the EU–US gap – although hardly all of it – may 
diminish over time as data quality improves.  24 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 14. R&D intensity in commercial services (percentage of sector value added) 
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
There is particular diversity within the commercial services sector, 
however. The large R&D gap is especially visible in wholesale and retail trade 
and repairs (Figure 15), a sector that has been instrumental in driving US 
productivity gains in recent years (as discussed in the previous chapter). 
The fact that virtually all EU countries trail so far behind the US in this 
respect points to deep-seated systemic causes. Factors that have fostered 
innovation and R&D in this sector in the US are deregulation and 
competition. In addition, this sector has invested heavily in ICT in the past 
decade, using new technologies and organisational flexibility to create 
highly efficient ‘big box’ retail solutions that have so far seen limited 
application in Europe.  
These organisational innovations and the economies of scale that 
accompany them make R&D in this sector profitable for investing firms in 
the US. But to spend the same amount of money on R&D in Europe 
without the accompanying deregulatory changes would be unlikely to 
bring sufficient gains for the investor to make such spending worthwhile.9  
                                                      
9 The notion that competition and deregulation are key to fostering R&D finds 
strong support in a recent cross-country study by the OECD (2005). The OECD 
finds that a reduction in anti-competitive product market regulations stimulates 
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Figure 15. R&D intensity in wholesale and retail trade and repairs (percentage of 
sector value added)  
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
A second area of services in which the EU as a whole lags far behind 
the US is the sector that we call renting, real estate and computer services. 
Although a mix of very different activities, this group contains R&D-
intensive sub-sectors such as the provision of IT services. As Figure 16 
illustrates, the three largest Continental EU countries – France, Germany 
and Italy – are far behind the US in this sector. Again, there is marked 
diversity within the EU. Three smaller countries – Denmark, Ireland and 
Sweden – are even ahead of the US in this sector. 
This sector has been found to account for a substantial (and growing) 
proportion of the US productivity lead over the EU in recent years. 
Uncovering the underlying causes of this gap not only in R&D but also 
more broadly in innovation and productivity is therefore crucial if Europe 
is to bridge its growth gap vis-à-vis the US.  
                                                                                                                                       
business R&D spending substantially, while restrictions to foreign direct 
investment and employment protection legislation are found to have a much 
smaller impact on R&D spending. 26 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 16. R&D intensity in renting, real estate, IT services and R&D (percentage 
of sector value added)  
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. 
One sector in which Europe compares relatively favourably – 
somewhat surprisingly – is financial intermediation, although the usefulness 
of the EU average is limited by the unavailability of data for France and the 
UK. As Figure 17 shows, in Germany R&D intensity in this sector is only 
one-third of that in the US. 
Figure 17. R&D intensity in financial intermediation (percentage of sector value added) 
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. R&D BY SECTOR: VARIATION ACROSS EU COUNTRIES | 27 
 
3.5  Concluding remarks 
The comparison of R&D across EU countries in manufacturing and services 
provides an illuminating qualification to Europe’s overall R&D gap relative 
to the US. Essentially, in manufacturing there is a clear dispersion among 
EU countries. Some EU member states are on par with or even above the 
US in terms of R&D spending in key manufacturing sectors, while others 
serve primarily as production sites with little own R&D. As a result, while 
there is an aggregate R&D gap in manufacturing, it is neither substantial 
nor consistent across countries and sectors. 
An uneven distribution of manufacturing R&D across EU countries 
should not be regarded as a problem in itself. On the contrary, several 
recent studies have pointed to positive, localised spillover effects in R&D 
that are substantial, which implies that the concentration of R&D in a few 
agglomerations boosts its overall productivity. Public policies aimed at 
dispersing R&D efforts geographically could easily be counterproductive, 
as such an outcome would lower the overall productivity of R&D spending 
and hence erode the incentives for individual firms to increase their R&D 
efforts. 
In contrast with manufacturing, the R&D deficit in services relative to 
the US is more evenly spread across EU member states. In services, the EU 
has few R&D leaders to match the US, Denmark being the apparent 
exception. As we also argued in the previous chapter, this suggests that the 
reasons for the R&D gap in services are more likely to be systemic. Given 
that R&D in services accounts for such a large proportion of the overall 
EU–US R&D gap (as discussed in the previous chapter), addressing these 
systemic impediments to R&D are essential to closing the EU’s overall R&D 
gap vis-à-vis the US. 
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4.  R&D ACROSS DIFFERENT FIRM SIZES 
he Lisbon strategy emphasised that the corporate sector would have 
to take the lead in boosting R&D spending in Europe. To see how 
this can be achieved, it helps to have a better understanding of where 
in the corporate sector R&D spending takes place with respect to firm size. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, there are distinct differences across 
both sectors and geographical entities. This chapter focuses on another, yet 
no less important element: the variation in R&D spending across different 
firm sizes. The discussion draws primarily on Eurostat data, as reported in 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry: Scoreboard 2007 (OECD, 2007).  
We need to stress up front that the focus on a single dimension of 
business sector R&D – in this case firm size – calls for some caution in the 
interpretation. Specifically, observed relationships between for instance 
R&D intensity across firm sizes and country size may be spurious, i.e. 
driven by other, unobserved variables such as sector characteristics. That 
being said, even this simple decomposition of business sector R&D by firm 
size is quite illuminating. 
4.1  SMEs account for a larger share of total business sector R&D 
in smaller countries 
R&D is by no means conducted solely by large industrial firms. As Figure 
18 shows, firms with fewer than 250 employees (which is the upper 
boundary of SMEs) account for some 22% of total business sector R&D in 
the EU, 14% in the US and 8% in Japan.  
The SMEs’ share of R&D spending differs markedly, however, 
between what we call the ‘EU Big 4’ – Germany, France, Italy and the UK – 
and the rest of the EU (old and new). The SMEs’ share of R&D in the EU 
Big 4 is almost identical to that of the US, whereas in the rest of the EU it is 
noticeably higher than in the US. 
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Figure 18. Business R&D by firm size (percentage of business sector R&D, 2005 or latest)  
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Source: OECD. 
If we look at individual countries (Figure 19), we see that this 
diversity in the SMEs’ share of R&D is also visible outside the EU. 
Figure 19. Business R&D by firm size in individual countries (percentage of 
business sector R&D, 2005 or latest)  
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An economy’s sectoral composition obviously has a large influence 
on the role of SMEs. Countries with large-scale manufacturing sectors such 
as Germany, Sweden and Finland not surprisingly have smaller SME 
shares in total business R&D spending than countries such as Norway, 
New Zealand and Greece.  
Country size also appears to have a distinct influence on the role of 
SMEs in total business R&D spending (Figure 20). With a few noteworthy 
exceptions (such as Sweden and Finland), SMEs tend to account for a larger 
share of total business R&D spending in small countries. In large ones such 
as the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK, SMEs account for no more 
than 20% of total business R&D spending. One explanation for this strong 
relationship between country size and large-firm R&D dominance could be 
that substantial home markets allow more large-scale industrial firms to 
develop and grow. Another factor could be that companies in large 
countries are more likely than are those in small countries to keep their 
R&D centres close to their corporate headquarters, i.e. within their own 
national borders. 
Figure 20. Business R&D in SMEs vs. country size 
US*
JP DE
FR
UK
IT KO
HU SE FI
CH AT NL
PO DK
CZ
PT CA
BE AU
ES IR
NO
SK GR
NZ
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
01234
GDP, trillion PPS
SME share in 
total business 
sector R&D (%)
 
* US GDP was $10.2 trillion in purchasing power standards (PPS) in 2005. 
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A second pertinent observation from this data is that large firms play 
a more dominant role in relatively more R&D-intensive countries. Other 
things being equal, a country dominated by SMEs is unlikely to have a high 
level of business R&D spending (Figure 21). 
Figure 21. R&D intensity in SMEs vs. the aggregate business sector 
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Source: OECD. 
4.2  Is public support for R&D biased towards large firms or 
SMEs? 
The predominantly large countries that have high ratios of business R&D 
spending to value added also direct a larger share of their public R&D 
support to large firms. As shown in Figures 22 and 23, a smaller share of 
public R&D support in the US and the EU Big 4 goes to SMEs (less than 
30%) than is the case in smaller EU economies. That is not surprising, as we 
have already seen that large firms also tend to account for a greater share of 
business R&D spending in larger countries. 32 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 22. Government-financed business R&D by SMEs (as a percentage of total 
government-financed business R&D, 2005 or latest) 
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*Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary 
Source: OECD. 
Figure 23. Government-financed business R&D by SMEs: Individual countries (as a 
percentage of total government-financed business R&D, 2005 or latest) 
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One way to illustrate the relationship between the SMEs’ share of 
business R&D and the SMEs’ share of public support is to plot these two in 
a scatter diagram, as shown in Figure 24. Here we clearly see the positive 
relationship between the two ratios.  
Figure 24. SMEs’ share of business R&D and government support (percentage) 
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Source: OECD. 
If public policy were completely neutral with respect to firm size, all 
countries would be on the straight line drawn in the diagram. On this line, 
the SMEs’ shares of total business R&D and public SME support are 
identical. As the diagram shows, however, in most countries there is a clear 
bias towards SMEs. In all countries above the line, SMEs receive a larger 
share of public support than their R&D share. This bias is particularly 
strong in Germany, Korea, Portugal, Hungary and Switzerland, in all of 
which SMEs receive a share of public R&D support that is more than 
double their share in business R&D spending. 
By comparison, in the US, Italy, France, Sweden and the UK, SMEs 
are treated neutrally or they even receive less than a proportionate share of 
public support. These countries also have notable domestic military 
hardware sectors, which tend to enjoy substantial public R&D support. 
This sector is usually dominated by large firms, which consequently attract 
a larger share of public R&D support. 34 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
4.3  The latest Community Innovation Survey suggests that SMEs 
rely less on in-house innovation than large firms do 
Surveys such as the recent Community Innovation Surveys10 (the CIS 4, 
conducted in 2004 with results reported in 2007 is the most recent) provide 
information about investments in R&D and innovation in small and large 
firms in different sectors across Europe. In these innovation surveys, inputs 
to the innovation process are primarily measured by spending on R&D. 
Innovation outputs are measured by the number of new products launched 
in markets or the turnover achieved with products no older than three 
years. The next three sections present some key results of the latest survey. 
1) In-house innovation, by firm size 
Productivity-enhancing innovation can either be developed in-house or be 
acquired from the outside. As might have been expected, the CIS survey 
shows that SMEs tend to be ‘adopters’ more frequently than large firms. In 
almost half of the countries surveyed, more than 40% of all large firms had 
developed a product innovation in-house. Among SMEs, the share 
developing product innovations in-house exceeded 20% in only around 
one-third of the countries (Figure 25). 
Figure 25. In-house product innovators by size (as a percentage of all firms) 
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Source: OECD. 
                                                      
10 The Community Innovation Surveys are carried out by national statistical offices 
throughout the EU. Data from these surveys is used for the annual European 
Innovation Scoreboard, published by the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Enterprise and Industry. R&D ACROSS DIFFERENT FIRM SIZES | 35 
 
The pattern is similar for in-house process innovations (Figure 26). 
The highest rates were found among large firms (over 45%), in Canada, 
Ireland, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg and Australia. The same countries 
plus New Zealand had rates above 20% for SMEs.  
Figure 26. In-house process innovators by size (as a percentage of all firms) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
K
o
r
e
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
N
o
r
w
a
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
.
J
a
p
a
n
I
t
a
l
y
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
.
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
P
o
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
.
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
S
p
a
i
n
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
r
a
n
c
e
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
L
u
x
e
m
b
.
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
G
r
e
e
c
e
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
C
a
n
a
d
a
SMEs Large firms
 
Source: OECD. 
2) Innovation and economic performance 
Innovation is not conducted for its own sake, but aims at generating a 
competitive edge in the market. It is thus important to take stock of the 
output of the innovative process.  
In the survey, the innovation output is measured in the form of new 
or significantly improved products (Figure 27). In the EU-27, there are 
marked differences across firm size classes. Large enterprises accounted for 
the highest share of enterprises introducing new or improved products to 
the market. Although this was the case in both industry and services, the 
gap was clearly smaller in the latter. 36 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 27. Firms that introduced new or improved products to the market (as a 
percentage of all firms engaged in innovation activity, by sector and 
size class, EU-27, 2004) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
The importance of firm size in the introduction of new products 
differs across countries in ways that are quite illuminating. As shown in 
Figure 28, the cross-country variation is small for large firms. Presumably, 
large firms all operate in a similarly competitive, international business 
environment. That is not the case for SMEs, however. Since SMEs tend to 
be much more domestically oriented, their business environment is to a 
greater extent determined by domestic institutional and competitive 
conditions. In this sense, it is noteworthy that SMEs in Germany, Italy and 
France introduce new or improved products to a lesser degree than do their 
peers in the UK and Sweden. In the latter two countries, SMEs are not 
much different from large firms in this respect. One interpretation of this 
finding is that the UK and Sweden have gone further in competition-
enhancing product market liberalisation, hence forcing SMEs to become 
more innovative to stay in business. In contrast, SMEs in the large 
Continental European countries seem to operate in a more protected 
environment, which in turn requires less innovation. R&D ACROSS DIFFERENT FIRM SIZES | 37 
 
Figure 28. Firms that introduced new or improved products to the market (as a 
percentage of all firms engaged in innovation activity, by sector and 
size class, 2004) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
One measure of the importance of innovation for individual firms is 
the share of their turnover that stems from new-to-market product 
innovations. As seen in Figure 29, in most countries the difference between 
SMEs and large firms in this respect is not very significant. Exceptions are 
Germany and Poland, where the share of turnover from such innovations 
was three times higher for large firms than it was for SMEs. 
Figure 29. Share of turnover owing to new-to-market product innovations by size 
(as a percentage of turnover for all firms, 2002–04) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
N
o
r
w
a
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
.
G
r
e
e
c
e
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
C
a
n
a
d
a
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
S
p
a
i
n
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
L
u
x
e
m
b
.
F
r
a
n
c
e
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
S
w
e
d
e
n
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
P
o
l
a
n
d
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
.
K
o
r
e
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
SMEs Large firms
 
Source: OECD. 38 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
3) Collaboration with public research organisations by innovating firms 
Collaboration is an important part of the innovation activities of many 
firms. As defined by Eurostat, this involves “active participation in joint 
innovation projects with other organisations”, but excludes the pure 
subcontracting of work. Collaboration can involve the joint development of 
new products, processes or other innovations with customers and 
suppliers, as well as horizontal work with other enterprises or public 
research bodies.  
Around one in ten of all firms (or one in four innovating firms) in 
Europe collaborated with a partner for their innovation activities during 
2002–04 (Figure 30). Large firms were four times more likely to collaborate 
than SMEs were. Among SMEs, the rate of collaboration is fairly similar 
across countries, ranging between 10 and 20% of all firms in more than half 
of the countries surveyed, but it varies widely for large firms.  
Figure 30. Firms collaborating in innovation activities, by size class (as a 
percentage of all firms, 2002–04) 
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Source: OECD. 
Collaboration with public research organisations (higher education or 
government research institutes) can be an important source of knowledge 
transfer for the innovation activities of firms. Here again, large firms are 
much more active than SMEs are and show much more cross-country 
variation (Figure 31). Collaboration between large firms and public 
research organisations is particularly common in the smaller northern 
European countries.  R&D ACROSS DIFFERENT FIRM SIZES | 39 
 
Figure 31. Firms collaborating in innovation activities with higher education 
institutions, by size (as a percentage of all firms, 2002–04) 
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Source: OECD. 
Firms collaborate on average less with government research centres 
than with higher education institutions, although the overall distribution 
across countries is similar in the two cases (Figure 32).   
Figure 32. Firms collaborating in innovation with government institutions, by size 
(as a percentage of all firms, 2002–04) 
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4.4  Concluding remarks 
The statistics and survey results presented in this chapter provide a 
snapshot of R&D across different firm sizes in Europe. On balance, the 
evidence shows that whereas SMEs are not negligible sources of business 
R&D spending, R&D activities are still dominated by large firms. This 
large-firm dominance of R&D spending is particularly true for the US and 
Japan, which is noteworthy as both serve as role models for Europe’s 
ambition to boost overall business R&D spending. These observations raise 
serious questions regarding the ability of SMEs to play more than a 
supporting role in elevating Europe’s business R&D spending. 
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5.  THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
R&D SPENDING  
e have seen in earlier chapters how R&D intensities in European 
countries vary across sectors, countries and firm sizes. 
Understanding this variability affords us a greater 
understanding of where the EU–US R&D gap originates. Just as US R&D 
spending is not evenly distributed across these dimensions, it is unlikely 
that any future increase in EU R&D spending would be achieved uniformly 
across all sectors, countries or firm sizes. Nor would R&D spending likely 
be applied optimally if that were the case. 
Similarly, R&D spending is subject to a substantial gravitational pull 
from innovative clusters. Using Eurostat data, this chapter first takes a 
descriptive look at the regional concentration of R&D intensities (i.e. R&D 
clustering beyond what can be accounted for by the concentration of 
economic activity). Second, it investigates whether such clustering makes 
R&D more or less productive in terms of patent applications. 
5.1  R&D spending by NUTS 2 regions 
Eurostat collects and disseminates increasingly detailed regional statistics 
on R&D spending, human capital for research and patents. On the basis of 
these data, it is clear that R&D activity is heavily concentrated in a 
relatively small number of regional clusters. Table 4 offers an overview of 
the distribution of R&D intensities across European countries. 
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Table 4. R&D intensity: Top and bottom NUTS 2* regions in each country (as a 
percentage of GDP, 2003) 
Country
All 
sectors
Business 
sector Top Region
All 
sectors
Business 
sector Bottom region 
All 
sectors
Business 
sector
EU-25 1.90 1.22
EU-15 1.95 1.26
NMS-10 0.77 0.34
SE 3.95 2.93 Västsverige 6.03 5.26 Mellersta Norrland 0.52 0.26
FI 3.43 2.42 Pohjois-Suomi 4.60 3.55 Åland 0.16 0.08
DK 2.56 1.77 Denmark 2.56 1.77 Denmark 2.56 1.77
DE 2.52 1.76 Braunschweig 8.70 6.75 Weser-Ems 0.57 0.34
FR 2.17 1.36 Midi-Pyrénées 3.72 2.40 Corse 0.24 0.16
BE 1.89 1.31 Vlaams Gewest 2.08 1.51 Bruxelles-Capitale 1.18 0.57
UK* 1.79 1.14 Eastern (NUTS1) 4.34 3.53 N. Ireland (NUTS1) 1.00 0.46
NL 1.76 1.01 Noord-Brabant 2.68 2.37 Zeeland 0.76 0.70
LU 1.66 1.48 Luxembourg 1.66 1.48 Luxembourg 1.66 1.48
SI 1.32 0.84 Slovenia 1.32 0.84 Slovenia 1.32 0.84
CZ 1.25 0.76 Strední Cechy 2.59 2.29 Severozápad 0.30 0.27
IE 1.16 0.77 South-East (NUTS1) 1.21 0.80 Mid-West (NUTS1) 0.92 0.65
IT 1.11 0.52 Lazio 1.89 0.48 Valle d'Aosta 0.37 0.25
ES* 1.05 0.57 Comunidad de Mad 1.69 0.96 Canarias 0.52 0.09
HU 0.93 0.34 Közép-Magyarorszá 1.38 0.58 Észak-Magyarország 0.27 0.08
EE 0.79 0.27 Estonia 0.79 0.27 Estonia 0.79 0.27
PT 0.74 0.25 Lisboa 1.03 0.36 Região Autón.Made 0.19 0.01
LT 0.67 0.14 Lithuania 0.67 0.14 Lithuania 0.67 0.14
EL* 0.63 0.20 Attiki 0.93 0.37 Kentriki Ellada 0.30 0.03
SK 0.58 0.32 Bratislavský kraj 1.12 0.39 Východné Slovensko 0.28 0.14
PO 0.54 0.15 Mazowieckie 1.14 0.27 Swietokrzyskie 0.06 0.02
BU 0.50 0.10 Yugozapaden 1.03 0.16 Severozapaden 0.02 0.00
RO 0.39 0.22 Bucuresti 1.13 0.46 Sud-Est 0.12 0.08
LV 0.38 0.13 Latvia 0.38 0.13 Latvia 0.38 0.13
CY 0.35 0.07 Cyprus 0.35 0.07 Cyprus 0.35 0.07
MT 0.26 0.08 Malta 0.26 0.08 Malta 0.26 0.08
US 2.67 1.86 New Mexico 7.12 … Wyoming 0.40 …
JP 3.20 2.40 … … … … … …
National average Top regional R&D intensity Bottom regional R&D intensity
 
* NUTS 1 data for the UK, Spain and Greece 
Sources: Eurostat and the US National Science Foundation (for American states, 2001). 
The regional heterogeneity in R&D intensity is striking. While some 
EU NUTS 2 regions have R&D spending near or even above the Lisbon 
target of 3% of GDP, the least active employ only 0.1% of GDP in R&D. 
Although regional R&D data are not yet available for all EU 
countries, Eurostat has identified 21 EU regions that have already achieved 
the 3% Lisbon target. Nine of these are in Germany, among them 
Braunschweig, the region with the highest R&D intensity of all, at 8.7% 
(Table 4). REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF R&D SPENDING | 43 
 
The other regions that have exceeded the 3% target are in Sweden 
(four regions out of Sweden’s eight), Finland (three regions out of its five), 
France and Austria (two regions each) and the UK (one region).  
In addition to the above-mentioned 21 regions, R&D expenditure 
exceeded 2% of GDP in another 17. Most of these regions were in Germany 
(five), France (four), the Czech Republic and the Netherlands (two each), 
and one each in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. 
The regions with the lowest R&D intensity are mainly in eastern and 
southern Europe. Of the 104 EU regions with R&D intensities below 1% of 
GDP, 41 were in the new member states.11  
5.2  Patent applications by NUTS 2 regions 
R&D expenditure is the most commonly used proxy for the resources 
allocated to the innovative process. With respect to economic impact, 
however, only the outputs count. One proxy for innovative output is patent 
applications.  
Also, patents are subject to dense clustering at the regional level. The 
region with the highest number of patents per capita is Noord-Brabant in 
the Netherlands. This is followed by seven German regions with more than 
300 patent applications per million inhabitants. The other most patent-
intensive regions are found in Sweden (three) and in Finland and the UK 
(two each). Most of these correspond fairly closely to high levels of 
business R&D expenditures. As shown in Figure 33, there is a strong 
(slightly non-linear) correlation between regional business R&D intensity 
and patent applications per million inhabitants (the correlation has an R2 of 
0.62 in the case of business R&D, against 0.59 for all-sector R&D). The non-
linearity suggests increasing returns to R&D. This means that a doubling of 
inputs (R&D) more than doubles the output (patent applications). This 
observation is also consistent with the existence of positive localised 
spillovers, an issue that is discussed in greater detail later on. 
                                                      
11 A map visually representing these regional differences can be found in Eurostat 
(2007b).  44 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
Figure 33. A non-linear correlation between R&D intensity and patent 
applications across NUTS 2 regions 
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Source: Eurostat. 
If the clustering of R&D has real economic consequences, then there is 
value in studying whether this clustering differs across countries.  
Below we measure and compare regional R&D dispersion across 
countries. To make countries comparable to one another we normalise 
regional R&D intensities so that each country’s national average is 100. We 
then rank the regions of each country by R&D intensity and calculate 
quartile averages. The 1st quartile hence includes the quarter of regions in a 
country with the lowest R&D intensities, while the 4th quartile is the quarter 
of regions in a country with the highest R&D intensities.  
The four quartiles are shown for a selection of – mostly larger – 
countries as bars in Figure 34. For example, in Spain the average R&D 
intensity of the 4th quartile was 135% of the Spanish national average. By 
contrast, average R&D intensity in the 1st quartile was only 57% of the 
national average (the number of regions in each country is shown in 
parentheses). REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF R&D SPENDING | 45 
 
Figure 34. R&D intensity by NUTS 2 region quartile (percentage of national average) 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
To compare the regional dispersion of R&D intensities across 
countries more easily, we also calculate the ratio of the highest (4th) to the 
lowest (1st) quartile. The more dispersed the R&D intensities in a country, 
the higher is this ratio. If all regions had exactly the same R&D intensity, 
this ratio would be 1. In the diagram, this is shown as the black diamonds, 
measured against the right-hand scale.  
As Figure 34 shows, there are notable differences across countries in 
terms of regional dispersion of R&D intensity, thus measured.12 In the case 
of Spain and the Netherlands, R&D intensity in the top quartile is only 
around 2.5 times that of the bottom quartile, while in Germany and Sweden 
it is 6-7 times greater. A general pattern is that the regional dispersion is 
higher in countries with high overall levels of R&D intensity (Germany, 
Sweden and Finland), as well as in the new member states, where the bulk 
of R&D is heavily concentrated in one or two regions against a mostly rural 
backdrop. The pattern of higher regional R&D disparities in countries such 
                                                      
12 An alternative measure of regional disparities is to calculate the standard 
deviation across all regions and scale this to the average, also known as the 
coefficient of variation (CoV). This statistically more precise (if less intuitive) 
measure does not leave us with a dramatically different impression. Disparities in 
Sweden and Germany are still higher than elsewhere. 46 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
as Germany and the Nordic countries would be repeated in other countries 
if they were to increase spending on R&D in key innovative centres. Taking 
again the example of Spain, if we assume that R&D spending was to double 
in all regions except for those in the bottom quartile, then the 4th/1st ratio 
would also double, from 2.4 to 4.7. 
5.3  Regional dispersion is higher in business sector R&D 
Across the board, the regional dispersion increases when we zoom in on 
business sector R&D (Figure 35). In Italy, Sweden, Romania, Germany and 
Poland, the 4th to 1st quartile ratio is now above 8. This result is not 
unexpected, since business R&D is more likely to feel the pull of 
agglomeration forces than either the government or education sectors, 
which in turn serve as a form of regional equaliser in the aggregate R&D 
figures (although, it should be stressed, not necessarily with positive 
overall economic results). 
Figure 35. Business R&D intensity by NUTS 2 region quartile (percentage of the 
national average) 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
We have limited the presentation in the two figures above to larger 
countries. Discussing regional disparities in countries with only a few 
regions is less meaningful. We have also included the smaller EU countries 
in the aggregates shown in Figure 36, however. The much larger number of 
regions in these aggregates provides a fairly reliable picture of the regional 
disparities for the EU as a whole.  REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF R&D SPENDING | 47 
 
Interestingly, there is little difference between the EU-15 and the 
NMS-12. In both cases, business sector R&D is more regionally 
concentrated than aggregate R&D. In the EU-15 and the NMS-12 alike, the 
top quartile has an R&D intensity that is around 8-9 times higher and a 
business R&D intensity that is 16-17 times higher than the bottom quartiles. 
For comparison, we have also included data on the US – based on all-sector 
state-level data.13 Although this regional level is not fully comparable with 
European NUTS 2 regions, the data indicate that US R&D is somewhat less 
regionally concentrated than it is in the EU-15.14 Still, the difference 
between the US and the EU-15 is not substantial, which suggests that the 
regional concentration of innovative activity observed in the EU is close to 
what one should expect in open, competitive economies. 
Figure 36. Business R&D intensity by NUTS 2 region quartile (percentage of 
national/group average) 
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Note: The number of regions is shown in parentheses. 
Sources: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat and the US National Science 
Foundation. 
 
                                                      
13 Plus Washington, D.C.  
14 This is also the conclusion of some empirical studies, for instance one by 
Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose & Storper (2007). 48 | KRISTIAN UPPENBERG  
5.4  Is the clustering of R&D a good thing? 
Is the clustering of R&D a good thing or is it a regional equity problem? If 
there are agglomeration effects or positive localised spillovers, then the 
clustering of R&D activity makes it more productive, boosting aggregate 
productivity and output. Positive ‘localised’ spillovers here means that the 
R&D activities of one firm have a positive influence on the productivity of 
R&D by other firms, but only so long as they are not too far away. To 
understand why this may be the case, it is useful to distinguish between 
codified and uncodified knowledge. Spending on R&D by one firm gives 
rise to new knowledge that can be shared by other firms, thus making their 
own R&D efforts more productive. Some of this new knowledge is 
typically documented in the form of a patent, which should be as easily 
understandable for distant users as for those nearby, assuming that they 
know how to read patents. This ‘codified’ part of the innovative output is 
hence a pure public good and independent of distance. But there is also a 
wealth of imperfectly codified knowledge attached to the researchers 
involved in the research project generating the patent. Certain aspects of 
this knowledge are only transferable through face-to-face interactions. One 
can think of this as a ‘local public good’, benefiting scientists within the 
region or in neighbouring regions but fading away with distance as 
contacts and interactions decrease.  
That there are positive but geographically concentrated spillovers 
from R&D is elegantly demonstrated by Bottazzi & Peri (2003). They 
estimate the relationship between R&D spending (a measure of the inputs 
to the innovative process) and patent data (a measure of innovation output) 
across 86 European regions (both variables are normalised to intensities per 
square km in order to eliminate the influence of varying region size). Since 
this relationship has been found in the literature to be of a long-term 
nature, the authors use a cross-section of long-run averages across regions 
for the 1977 to 1995 period, disregarding changes over time.  
R&D spending is assumed to consist of both a private component that 
cannot be shared with other producers and an ‘idea’ component that can. 
They then test whether R&D spending in one region is affected by R&D 
spending in neighbouring regions. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF R&D SPENDING | 49 
 
The authors make some very illuminating observations on R&D 
spillovers. They find that there are indeed statistically significant positive 
spillovers from R&D, but only up to a range of 300 km. 
The way Bottazzi & Peri demonstrate that spillovers are localised is to 
split the region sample into sub-samples according to distances between 
regions (five different distance classes). They also include country dummies 
to account for border effects. The results are striking. Doubling R&D 
spending in a region is found to increase innovation output (patent 
applications) by 80-90% in that region. This is known as the internal effect. 
In addition, there are statistically significant spillover (external) effects on 
bordering regions, boosting patent applications there by 2-3%, but only in 
regions within 300 km. Beyond that there are no statistically significant 
spillovers. A 2-3% spillover does not seem like a very large impact 
compared with the internal effect. Yet, as the average European region has 
about 15 other regions within a 300 km distance from itself, the overall 
effect if each of them were to double their R&D intensity would be a quite 
sizeable 40% more patenting owing to external effects, on top of the 80-90% 
increase owing to internal effects. Taken together, a doubling of inputs 
leads to more than a doubling of output when clustered regions act 
together. 
That R&D generates tacit knowledge not easily transferred over large 
distances is a common result in much of the empirical literature on 
knowledge spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson (1993) show that 
inventors are more likely to cite patents whose origins are geographically 
nearer than those from further afar. Griffith, Harrison & Van Reenen (2006) 
similarly show that British firms that locate R&D labs in the US were more 
able to tap into American knowledge than those that did not. Much of this 
literature uses older data, however, and says little about changes over time. 
One recent study, by Griffith, Lee & Van Reenen (2007) bridges an 
important gap in this respect by comparing “home bias” in patent citations 
of an early period (1975–89) with those of a later period (1999–99). Similar 
to earlier studies, evidence of a substantial home bias emerges. German 
firms are notably quicker to refer to other German citations, the British to 
other British citations, and so on. But comparing the results from the two 
periods also shows that this home bias has declined over time. This trend is  
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interesting in that it is consistent with an increasingly interconnected 
European economy, driven by falling transport and communication costs, 
which might be making R&D spillovers less localised than they used to 
be.15 
5.5  Concluding remarks 
Given the magnitude of the localised spillovers suggested by the 
aforementioned research, the return to R&D investment is bound to remain 
substantially higher in regional clusters with already high levels of R&D 
spending. These agglomeration effects generate a formidable first-mover 
advantage for R&D clusters that will likely prove difficult to dislodge. 
Public policies that aim at ‘creating’ new innovative centres where none has 
existed before may therefore prove highly wasteful. To the extent that the 
goal is to maximise the impact of R&D on economic growth in Europe, a 
m o r e  f r u i t f u l  a p p r o a c h  b y  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s  p r o b a b l y  t o  c r e a t e  a n  
environment conducive to more innovation by firms in existing R&D 
agglomerations. 
                                                      
15 The authors allow for fixed effects to account for possible unobserved factors 
that are correlated with geography, for instance persistent quality differences in 
patents across countries. This reduces the size and occurrence of the home bias 
relative to earlier studies but does not eliminate it altogether.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
his report has aimed at shedding some light on the EU’s R&D gap 
vis-à-vis the US and Japan by disaggregating R&D expenditure data 
in several ways. We have seen that there is indeed notable diversity 
in R&D spending across sectors, firm sizes and geographical entities in 
Europe. But such diversity also exists in the US, which suggests that a 
closing of the R&D gap, if and when it occurs, is unlikely to take place 
homogeneously across all these dimensions. There are sound economic 
reasons for R&D spending to be concentrated in certain industries, 
countries and regions. As discussed in this study, innovation is 
characterised by positive externalities, which means that the productivity 
of a euro spent on R&D is affected by the environment and circumstances 
in which it is spent. One example we have seen concerns locational 
spillovers, where the productivity of R&D spending in terms of patent 
applications is higher if it takes place near the R&D activities of other 
related firms. Another example is that the rate of return on investing in 
R&D is influenced by the competitiveness in each sector. Policies that seek 
to boost spending on R&D in the European business sector will have to 
target the factors that give incentives for firms to innovate, taking these 
issues into consideration. Doing so would not only likely be more 
successful in boosting R&D spending, it would also make these R&D 
activities more effective. 
But perhaps the most important lesson from the data presented in this 
study is that there are many areas in which the EU does not differ from or 
lag behind the US. In large segments of the manufacturing industry, for 
example, European firms spend as muc h  o n  R & D  a s  U S  f i r m s  d o .  T h e  
biggest gaps in R&D spending between the US and the EU are in market  
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services and high-technology manufacturing, which not coincidentally is 
also where a large share of the US–EU productivity gap can be found. As 
economies develop, market services tend to grow in size relative to the 
manufacturing industry. Europe is gradually following the US example in 
this direction. As in the US, Europe’s future comparative advantage is 
unlikely to be in medium-technology manufacturing. Therefore, if the 
innovative and productivity shortfalls in market services and high-
technology sectors were to remain, then Europe would over time widen 
rather than narrow its distance behind the US. 
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